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Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian
and Gay Family Advocacy
Paula L. Ettelbrick*
Just last month, the University of Vermont announced that gay
employees have until the end of 2001 to enter into a civil union'
with their partners or they will lose their domestic partner benefits.
2
The new policy will revoke the University's long-standing commit-
ment to ensure unmarried employees the same health and family
benefits that are routinely extended to married employees. As we
have argued for years, the denial of employment benefits to unmar-
ried employees is "an equal pay for equal work" issue. If married
employees receive health care, bereavement leave, or family sick
leave for the benefit of their families, then unmarried employees
are entitled to the same compensation. Sadly, in the wake of the
gay community's historic success in achieving a state status fully
equal to marriage, domestic partnership - an equally historic suc-
cess - begins to die a slow death.
It is sobering to see how quickly a 25-year social justice battle
to expand the circle of families who may receive some of the legal,
economic, and social supports provided to married families can
screech to a halt. Many wonder whether Vermont's civil union law
is a compromise to, or a victory for "marriage rights" because it
does not incorporate the term "marriage." While I am left wonder-
ing whether either could be considered a full victory for our fami-
lies if the result is the repeal of the hard-won recognition that all
families, whether married or not, deserve similar economic and le-
gal supports.
* Family Policy Director, Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force. For more information please go to http://www.ngltf.org.
See Baker v. State, 744 A. 2d 864 (Vt. 2000). In response to the Vermont
Supreme Court decision in Baker, the state legislature passed a "civil union" law
allowing same-sex partners to certify their relationship with the State, thus enti-
tling them to all of the rights and benefits of civil marriage. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 5164, 5160, 5162 (Supp. Sept. 2000). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202
(Supp. Sept. 2000).
2 Associated Press, David Gram, University of Vermont Links Benefits to
Unions (Sept. 27, 2000) (on file with author).
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Certainly the proposition that employers are not entitled to
pay unmarried workers less than married workers has been long
been settled. Yet, the marriage/civil union advocates who have
promised that the battle for civil marriage is not intended to undo
the movement for equal family benefits for all families have failed
to express any public outrage over this hasty retreat from family
equality principles. Scores of lesbian and gay employees stand to
lose their benefits or be coerced into the state's civil union relation-
ship as a result of the University's change of policy. The lesbian
and gay employees simply wish to hang on to the benefits that they
had every right to believe are simply part of a fair, equitable, and
discrimination-free policy of equal pay for equal work. Now, the
University has turned "back to the future." Now, the employees
have discovered that their own community has collaborated in re-
creating the system in which only those who marry or become civil
union partners are entitled to equal workplace benefits, while every
other family is once again left to struggle in the margins.
I, for one, am greatly distressed by such a result. It is neither
just nor essential to concede that the legitimate price for marriage is
the loss of laws and policies, which acknowledge non-marital fami-
lies within our own community and outside of the lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender ("LGBT") communities. These are the
changes that have allowed people to remain in their homes upon
the death of a life partner,3 enforce property and contractual agree-
ments,4 obtain bereavement leave for the death of a partner,5 and
establish a legal claim as a second parent to children they are rais-
ing with a partner,6 despite their unmarried status.
In 1990, even the federal government began to count unmar-
ried partners as a significant demographic of family life in the
United States.7 These social and policy changes enacted over the
last 20 years, and hundreds others like them, have allowed us to
3 Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E. 2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
4 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 p. 2D 106 (Cal . 1976). See also Crooke v.
Gilden, 414 S.E. 2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
5 See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-244, 3-240 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. Jul.
2000). The Majority of domestic partner policies extend benefits to unmarried
workers regardless of whether they are in same-sex or different-sex relationships.
6 See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
7 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Economics & Statistics Admin., Bureau of the
Census, 1990 Census of Population: Summary of Social, Economic, and Hiring
Characteristics available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decenial.html
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view families, not just through the lens of formal documents and
state conferred entitlement, but also, through the day-to-day func-
tions of caregiving and commitment. In large measure, the work of
feminist and lesbian and gay family advocates has widened the
boundaries around family structures in order to fairly disburse the
privileges associated with being considered a "legitimate" family.
The University of Vermont's swift departure from the broader
principles of both workplace equity and family recognition signals
the trouble ahead for our community's family advocacy efforts. I
fear that we are on a collision course in which either marriage or
non-marital family recognition must win out, but neither can co-
exist. The University's change warns us of the need to step back to
review our goals and strategies in an effort to ally our community's
mutual goals of achieving full recognition and support for all fami-
lies; as well as its subset, civil marriage for same-sex couples. All
sides of the so-called "lesbian and gay marriage debate" 8 have
learned enough, through the years of vigorous debate and strategiz-
ing, to understand the critical importance of both broad-based fam-
ily recognition and access to civil marriage. What we have not done
is sufficiently acknowledge this probable collision course of ideals
- the social justice ideal of full family recognition and the civil
rights ideal of gay-inclusive marriage laws.
One obstacle to our inability to reconcile these two goals has
been the limited structures in which families function from a legal
and policy perspective. There is a huge gap between being married
and being unmarried. If you marry, your mutual commitment is
assumed, supported, and valorized; if you are unmarried your rela-
tionship is either overlooked as socially insignificant or demonized
as socially destructive - whether you are gay or straight. Our sys-
tem has very few ways to acknowledge and value mutually support-
ive relationships that are either not premised on sexual intimacy or,
if sexually intimate, are non-marital by choice. Parenthood suffers
some of the same problems. With some exceptions, you are either a
8 By this I refer to Bill Eskridge's characterization of the Tom Stoddard-
Paula Ettelbrick perspectives on the role of marriage as a strategy of lesbian and
gay family recognition which were published in OUT/LOOK Magazine (1989).
See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 51, 52-85 (1996). The pieces are repub-
lished in SUZANNE SHERMAN, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMIT-
MENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES (1992).
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full parent with the power to assert that relationship in any forum,
or a "biological stranger"9 with no legally cognizable relationship to
the child that you raised, cared for, and nurtured.
I have a few ideas for adopting a strategy of defining a contin-
uum of family structures that could address family and caregiving
needs beyond marriage and marriage-like relationships. Already,
four separate structures exist at the state level: traditional man/
woman marriage, covenant marriage (available in Louisiana), civil
unions (available in Vermont), and domestic partnership registry
(available in California). All of these are structured as marriage or
marriage-like relationships. I add to the mix something I call "des-
ignated family partnership" as well as functionally recognized rela-
tionships. There are, naturally, many others to propose and,
undoubtedly, some flaws or difficulties in my proposal. My main
goal, however, with my esteemed group of colleagues present at this
symposium, is to propose strategies out of the all or nothing ap-
proach of marriage, or the potentially divisiveness of seeing one im-
portant struggle defeat another.
I must start though with a few basic premises. First, we cannot
and should not abandon the progress made in restructuring family
definitions to meet the needs of more families. As Justice
O'Connor and some of her colleagues acknowledged this summer
in Troxel v. Granville, family structures have changed visibly and
dramatically in the last few decades.' 0 By necessity, these demo-
graphic and cultural shifts call for changes to law and policy so that
the needs of all families can be addressed. Even a majority, or at
least a plurality, of the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
maintaining old rules that force families into certain acceptable and
unacceptable boxes, as opposed to restructuring the rules to better
accommodate everyone's interests, is ill-advised. In order to meet
the right balance, the better choice is to allow legislators and policy
makers to explore the perimeters of the law and family structure.
If the Supreme Court of the United States is prepared to re-
define some of the basic rules and structure of family, we should
certainly not abandon our efforts. The LGBT community's 20-year
advocacy for definitions of family that are lesbian and gay inclusive
does not come only from our need to "work around" the marriage
laws. Many of us also believe in a commitment to social justice for
9 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E. 2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
10 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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all families, gay and non-gay families alike. Those who fail to con-
form to the legal and social structures of family and sexuality - as
enforced primarily through marriage - are nonetheless entitled to
the expanding number of privileges and benefits awarded to fami-
lies who conform.
Second, our contributions to unlatching family structure norms
from institutionally- or ideologically-based to more functionally-
based should not be viewed as a stepping stone strategy on the way
to marriage. Rather, increased recognition for non-formalized fam-
ily structures is a strategic goal to be realized as co-existent with
marriage, not obliterated by it.
Our cultural message of "Love Makes a Family" has helped
courts, legislators, and policy makers re-think the essence of mar-
riage-like family relationships and parenting relationships. As a re-
sult, thousands of workplace policies now extend benefits to
domestic partners. Dozens of states regularly grant second parent
adoptions and thereby create legal structures with two parents of
the same sex. A growing number of state courts recognize that bi-
ology is not a necessary component to parenting. In addition, un-
countable numbers of hospitals, day care centers, medical offices,
schools, social service agencies, or business catering to the public no
longer assume in their practices or written policies that marriage is
the only relationship a couple may have with one another to be
considered family.
The term "domestic partner" has become part of our family
lexicon. Most gay-cognizant straight people use the term "partner"
to refer to lesbian and gay couples. Many have even incorporated
the word as their own reference point for their spouses. We have
substantially shifted the cultural view of family to include people
who are not married, gay or straight. This is a path well-worth
continuing.
Third, the current system of government and private disburse-
ment of seemingly endless family benefits and privileges to the for-
malized few discriminates cruelly against the non-formalized many.
There is simply no rational reason, from a personal or policy per-
spective, to deny federal family sick and medical leave benefits to
unmarried partners to enable them to care for one another with the
same devotion as married people. There is no rationale that can
support denying Social Security survivor benefits to a lesbian who
just lost her partner of 25 years while providing full benefits to a
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fourth spouse who was not even living with the deceased in the final
months of their 2 year marriage.
For our own community's sake as well, we must find solutions
to family recognition that go beyond the all or nothingness of mar-
riage, as there will be many lesbian and gay couples who, for any
number of reasons, will not choose marriage even if it is widely
available. At the same time, those of us who are firmly committed
to full family recognition must take into account the sincere, per-
sonal commitment that many in our community have to marriage.
Precisely because of the deep cultural meaning associated with mar-
riage and our outrage over the complete exclusion of our most
cherished relationships, marriage will and should be one of the
many demands we make for full family recognition.
At last, I get to my very preliminary proposal to consciously
create a continuum of family recognition options that span con-
servative proposals for covenant marriage to proposals for allowing
those who function as family to be acknowledged as such on a case-
by-case basis. Some options assume a marriage-type relationship
signified by sexual intimacy and/or parental caregiving. Some as-
sume that any group of people who care for one another should be
supported by our laws and policies. As a group, they are presented
to deviate from the idea that only marriage or even marriage-like
relationships make a family. It is my belief that all can co-exist.
And, all start with the basic premise, which I share, that family rela-
tionships are central to our needs as human beings and our struc-
ture as a society. So, here are the options that could conceivably
co-exist in each state to allow for more people to gain the benefits
associated with family policy.
COVENANT MARRIAGE
I present the option of covenant marriage primarily to illus-
trate the point that a state may adopt co-existing forms of marriage.
The Louisiana covenant marriage law11 is a response to no-fault di-
vorce laws, which conservative advocates believe have made mar-
riage a revolving door. Among other things, a covenant marriage is
more difficult to terminate, requiring parties to live separate and
apart for two years before seeking a divorce. A traditional mar-
riage in Louisiana may be terminated after a month of separation.
11 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 2000).
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In the interest of equality, covenant marriage, of course, should be
open to same-sex couples, though I am quite happy to leave it as is.
TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
Traditional marriage should be accessible on a sex-neutral ba-
sis. Furthermore, same-sex couples who want marriage, it would be
wiser to present and argue the case as a civil and human rights issue
and not as a benefits issue. Marriage serves as a potent and
strongly symbolic reminder of the status that certain people have as
full and equal citizens. If miscegenation laws can be struck down
because they help sustain a system of White Supremacy, then gen-
der-exclusive marriage laws should also be struck down because
they contribute to a system of patriarchal privilege and hetero-
normativity. Period.
If our common goal is to truly spread out family-related bene-
fits beyond those who are civilly married, then we must not premise
our constitutional arguments for marriage on the denial of benefits.
Vermont's marriage law presents a case in point. First, citing the
benefits as the main desire for marriage serves only to reinforce the
central role of marriage as the sole means by which benefits are
extended, and leaves the process by which economic and legal ben-
efits as disbursed unchallenged. As a result, concurrent efforts to
keep in place domestic partner policies that extend benefits beyond
married partners are undermined. Second, the primacy of the ben-
efits argument in Baker v. State was ultimately fatal to the plaintiffs'
claim to marriage. 12 Instead of forcing the court to confront the
deep cultural and political symbolism of marriage, and the way
marriage creates political and social hierarchies or acceptance that
are repugnant to constitutional equality, the emphasis on the bene-
fits of marriage, and the use of the Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont constitution, let the court and the legislature off the hook
by giving them the option of addressing the less controversial issue
of benefits while denying the infinitely more controversial issue of
marriage.
On the other hand, if we persist in arguing the benefits ratio-
nale for same-sex marriage, then we need to seriously consider ar-
guing the expansion of marriage to include more than just two
people. Our families do not neatly fit into the 2-person marriage
12 Baker, 744 A. 2d 864.
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structure. For example, in a growing number of cases, lesbians and
lesbian couples have developed close personal relationships with
men, either individually or in couples, through their mutual desire
to become parents. Children in these families have three or four
parents as part of their intact family structure. But, the uneven rec-
ognition of the individual relationships within these families is a
source of tremendous insecurity for both the children and the
adults. If, our community argues that civil marriage is the only ac-
ceptable route to full family recognition and the main argument for
marriage is to gain benefits, then we must not limit ourselves to
advocating for only 2-person coupled relationships. We must not
pretend that these families fit squarely within the marriage struc-
ture constructed to promote heterosexual reproduction and sexual
monogamy.
A much more honest and inclusive marriage position is one
that acknowledges the dilemma that our family structures present
to the reproductive premise of heterosexual marriage. If same-sex
marriage advocates view marriage as the preferred forum for bene-
fits, procreation and childrearing, then the distinct procreative and
childrearing structures of a growing number of lesbians and gay
men must be accommodated as well.
CIVIL UNIONS
Civil unions provide a very interesting opportunity for re-creat-
ing a truly civil form of family recognition that is not steeped in the
religious, patriarchal, and hetero-centric traditions of marriage.
Like marriage, civil unions should be available to same-sex and dif-
ferent-sex couples alike. While the disadvantage is that a civil
union still reveres the two person, sexually intimate family struc-
ture, the advantage is that it would allow a means of fully acknowl-
edging mutual commitment for many to whom marriage is
personally untenable. For example, many bisexuals in relationships
with partners of a different sex resist marriage because of the incon-
sistency between their bisexual identity and the projection of heter-
osexuality inherent in marriage. Likewise, many "straight"
supporters of the LGBT community, feminists, progressives, and
sex radicals refuse to marry for any number of reasons, ranging
from personal identity to personal politics. Even if civil marriage
were available to all same-sex couples tomorrow, many lesbian and
gay couples, as well, would convey their conscientious objection by
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refusing to marry. Yet many are likely to view civil unions as a
viable alternative that is less antagonistic to their personal
identities.
Civil unions present another advantage - they provide a clean
historical slate upon which to build. Unencumbered by social ex-
pectation, moral requirements, or procreative mandate, civil unions
offering a rare opportunity to create and shape the meaning of fam-
ily and the relationship among the participants. Instead of dispar-
aging civil unions as nothing but a "separate but equal"
compromise to marriage, I think we seize the opportunity to define
the social significance of civil unions. Through civil union laws, we
can re-tool the law's approach to family structures and decision-
making, especially with regard to the legal meaning and conse-
quences of procreation and childrearing.
For instance, we can re-define the equitable rules that govern
custody and visitation, especially since Vermont's civil union law
was designed for same-sex couples. Agreement to parent, not biol-
ogy, would define the rights of persons included in the parenting
structure of the relationship. This could include not only a lesbian
couple, but the male donor/father as well. Decisions regarding
child custody should not deliberately prefer the biological parent(s)
over the non-biological parent(s). Non-biological lesbian co-par-
ents should have full and equal standing in all custody and visitation
matters unless the couple made a clearly different decision at the
outset. Courts could assume that known donors are not the fathers
unless, at the outset, there is clear and convincing evidence that all
parties intended him to be a recognized father. We should develop
statutory and common law concepts of the "donor/father" - a per-
son whose role in a child's life is not that of a full father within the
meaning of the law, but is significant enough to ensure a right of
visitation and a continued relationship should a falling out occur
between him and the child's mother(s) - to help move us beyond
the all or nothingness of parenthood.
The trend among state activists is to introduce civil union laws
as a starting point for discussing same-sex relationship recognition
using the Vermont law as a model. Since the Vermont civil union
law mostly incorporates straight marriage law into the tenets of civil
union law, I propose that we consider this an opportunity to re-
draft sections of the law to remove the procreative and patriarchal
assumptions that may still exist in the statute.
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DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
The confusing nature of the direction of family recognition is
most obvious when examining domestic partnership. Originally in-
tended as an "equal pay for equal work" employment concept, do-
mestic partnership has blossomed into a full-fledged legal status
accomplished by a couple registering with a municipality or, now,
the State of California. While couples may register in dozens of
cities or the State of California, the short-coming of domestic part-
nership is that its public manifestation has included very few bene-
fits, if any, unless one of the parties is employed by the public entity
that allows for registration. This reality has lead to domestic part-
nership being bashed as "second class citizenship" by some in our
community who do not do not know its genesis. Personally, I be-
lieve that it is a mistake to move domestic partnership from the
private employment context into the public recognition arena with-
out establishing a concise meaning and purpose for such laws.
First, domestic partnership should be available to same- and
different-sex couples alike. Far too many domestic partnership pol-
icies include only gay couples because they are founded on the
faulty premise that the central problem with employment benefits
policies is that unmarried gay employees are denied benefits be-
cause they cannot marry. From my perspective, the real problem is
that employers discriminate against all unmarried employees by de-
nying them equal benefits for their partners and children. The
trend toward gay-only benefits serves only to reinforce the central-
ity of marriage in employment benefits structures: you are entitled
to benefits is either you are married or you cannot marry by law.
But, if you choose not to marry, you are out of luck, and thousands
of dollars in health coverage. Needless to say, this approach only
compounds the discrimination and denies "equal pay for equal
work."
Second, we should define domestic partnership to be a vehicle
by which a defined set of benefits and privileges can be accessed.
Right now, the California model by which a domestic partner regis-
try is created with the goal of, over time, attaching new benefits,
privileges and responsibilities, presents a very unstable legal status.
For example, let's say my partner is a state employee. We register
as domestic partners because it is the only way that she can put me
on her health care plan, but we have no personal desire otherwise
to have the state involved in our relationship. Over time, and in the
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name of lesbian and gay equality, the legislature begins passing dis-
parate laws defining the rights and responsibilities of domestic part-
ners, many of which go well beyond the level of state involvement
or consequences we have chosen for our relationship. They may
even be inconsistent with the decisions we have made in formal es-
tate and personal planning documents. The expectations we had
when we registered have now shifted dramatically and inconsis-
tently with our wishes, leaving us the unpleasant choice of either
succumbing to the new rules in order simply to keep the employ-
ment benefits, or dissolving our partnership and losing the employ-
ment benefits. Dramatic shifts in the meaning of domestic
partnership, even for the right reasons, are likely to be very unset-
tling for anyone who registered their partnership without any clear
idea of the legal consequences they may be undertaking. This,
then, is the primary reason to settle on a concise meaning for do-
mestic partnership.
For the sake of discussion, I propose that domestic partnership
encompass the bundle of issues related to a shared residence and
health-related rights and benefits. Tenancy rights, property insur-
ance, and domestic violence laws are some of the elements con-
nected to shared residency. Health benefits, healthcare decision-
making, family and medical leave, access to each other's health
records, and hospital and nursing home priority visitation are some
of the many things that help ease the burden of caring for one an-
other. Something along these lines would help us develop a concise
meaning of domestic partnership that the outside world can begin
to understand and acknowledge, while at the same time address a
finite number of specific concerns for family partners related to
their shared residency and caregiving commitment.
I have an alternate proposal for domestic partnership as well.
That is, to simply not take domestic partnership into the public
realm at all. Rather, leave domestic partnership just to the realm of
employment benefits as we continue to convince more employers to
provide family benefits to unmarried employees.
DESIGNATED FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
I would like to propose my own concept of what I call, for the
moment, a "designated family partnership." By my definition, fam-
ily partnership is a mutual caregiving relationship one may develop
with one or more other adults that is publicly recognized to take the
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place of the next of kin in a set number of circumstances. Sexual
intimacy need not be the core component of a designated family
partnership. In fact, the point of this proposal is to give official
recognition, within our law and policy, to the variety of family-type
caregiving relationships that are not sexually intimate. Moreover,
many close day-to-day caregiving relationships may exist between
people who live across the street, across town, or across the coun-
try; thus, living together in a shared domestic environment is not a
necessary component of a designated family partnership. I use the
word "family" to incorporate the common perception of family,
those who love and care for one another, into non-blood, non-sex-
ual family structures. Under my statutory scheme, the closest fam-
ily member may be a best friend, a former lover, a cousin, a niece, a
current lover, or a parent.
Unlike the one-way designation of a health care proxy, for ex-
ample, my proposal anticipates a mutuality between the designated
family members. The, goal is to expedite the support delivery
among these individuals, which is currently only allowed for those
who are spouses, children, or other formally recognized family
members or individuals. Here, there should be no "coupled"
boundaries that are the limitations of most other family recognition
approaches. For example, person A could enter into a family part-
nership with both person B and person C without it seeming incon-
sistent, non-monogamous, or polygamous. Sexual intimacy is not
necessarily the point or result of the relationship. For starters, fam-
ily and medical leave, health care decision-making, estate adminis-
tration, or next-of-kin status for burial purposes are just a few of
the many areas ripe for developing this concept.
My plan is to develop a bill that would incorporate these ideas.
I hope that many of you will be available to give me your reactions,
comments, and "critiques" about this idea.
DE FACTO FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
Finally, although I believe there are benefits to developing a
wider continuum of formal statutory schemes for recognizing a
broader range of family relationships, many of the cases from our
own community illustrate the importance of recognizing function
over form in specific circumstances where no formal structure has
been utilized. The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Braschi
v. Stahl Associates, for example, was remarkable because the court
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was guided by the policy goals of the state legislature. 13 The legisla-
ture sought to prevent unjust evictions of family members living in
the rent-controlled apartment of the primary tenant.' 4 By granting
the request of a surviving gay partner to be treated as family for
purposes of this particular law, the Court's result most closely ad-
heres to the legislature's goals. The Court analyzed the way the
couple functioned as family, rather than dismiss them as failing to
meet the formalized requirement of family. 1
5
As LGBT lawyers and advocates, we have long argued that the
underlying policy goals of family support or equal pay for equal
work issue should guide the decisions of employers, courts, and
others faced with a question about whether a particular family
structure should be supported and valued, despite the fact that it
does not conform with the norms of marriage. Even if same-sex
marriage or my range of family recognition vehicles were enacted
tomorrow, there would still be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and straight couples who would not formalize their family relation-
ships for any number of reasons. I do not believe that their refusal
to conform, to even our new social norms, should leave them in the
margins of family recognition.
13 Braschi, 543 N.E. 2d 49.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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